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Abstract
The extant literature on fat taxes and thin subsidies tends to focus on the overall e￿ectiveness
of such ￿scal instruments in altering diets and improving health. However, little is known about
the welfare impacts of ￿scal food policies on society. This paper ￿lls a gap in the literature by
assessing the distributional impacts and welfare e￿ects resulting from a tax-subsidy combination on
di￿erent food groups. Using the methods derived from marginal tax reform theory, a formal welfare
economics framework is developed allowing the calculation of the distributional characteristics of
various food groups and approximate welfare measures of prices changes caused by a tax-subsidy
combination. The distributional characteristics reveal that many of the food groups target by
a fat tax are consumed in greater concentration by low-income households than higher-income
households. The overall welfare e￿ect of a fat tax and thin subsidy combination is found to be
negative, meaning that the thin subsidy is not enough to compensate for the negative impacts of
the fat tax.
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11 Introduction
One of the most pressing public health challenges today is the prevalence of diet related chronic
disease resulting from poor dietary choices, speci￿cally overweight and obesity. According to the 2004
Health Survey for England, which records body mass index (BMI), nearly 65% of the adult population
were overweight (BMI greater than 25) while almost 25% were obese (BMI greater than 30). A great
deal of interest and attention is focused on the use of ￿scal interventions to combat spiralling obesity
rates, both in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Much of the work to date on fat taxes
and thin subsidies focuses on their overall e￿ectiveness to reduce unhealthy food consumption and
reduce obesity rates. While many of the studies conducted by economists tend to show only a slight
decrease in fat consumption resulting from a fat tax (Chouinard et. al 2007; Powell and Chaloupka
2009), studies by health professionals show that fat taxes have meaningful impacts through reduced
rates of cardiovascular disease (Marshall 2000; Mytton et. al 2007). For example, Mytton et. al (2007)
show that up to 3200 deaths from cardiovascular disease could be avoided in the UK through a fat tax
on a wide range of foods, and Marshall (2000) demonstrates that a tax on dietary saturated fat could
avert up to 1000 deaths a year in the UK.
Despite the attention on the use of fat taxes and thin subsidies as a method of regulating diets
and improving health, very little is known about the expected impacts such policies will have on the
welfare of the population as a whole. How much redistribution will be achieved by implementing a
combination of taxes and subsidies on various food groups? Will the proposed ￿scal interventions
harm consumers in terms of social welfare? How much of the welfare change may be attributed to fat
taxes, and how much of this damage can be compensated by the use of subsidies? These questions
are addressed using the tax reform methodology developed by Feldstein (1972) and Stern (1987) to
examine the distributional consequences and welfare implications of fat taxes and thin subsidies on
food consumption.1 Addressing the welfare implications of a fat tax is not as clear as it might initially
seem however. Drenowski (2004) ￿nds that obesity and type 2 diabetes follow a socioeconomic gradient
in the U.S. in which the highest rates of disease are found among groups with the highest poverty rates
and the least education. An obvious explanation is found in Dowler’s (2003) concept of ￿food poverty￿
where in developed countries a pattern exists with households living on low wages have lower nutrient
intakes and worse dietary patterns than households in a better economic position.
1For summaries see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Stern and Newbery (1987), and Santoro (2007). For applications
see Ahmad and Stern (1984), Newbery (1995), Ray (1999), Liberati (2001), and Kaplanoglou (2004).
2From a classical welfare economics perspective, taxing foods will be highly regressive on low income
households, especially when the tax is targeted on energy-dense, nutrient-poor, fatty foods which are
disproportionately consumed in low income households. However, from a public health perspective,
taxing unhealthy foods will reduce diet related chronic diseases, increase nutrient intakes, and improve
dietary patterns, particularly in the low income households. The extent to which a thin subsidy
mitigates these e￿ects is uncertain and largely depends on demand behaviour. Consequently, a fat tax
will have a negative welfare e￿ect in terms of regressive wealth redistribution, however such a policy
will also have a positive welfare e￿ect in terms of progressive health redistribution. In short, there is a
health-wealth trade-o￿ to a ￿scal food policy. Depending on the responsiveness of consumers to price
changes in di￿erent food groups, a thin subsidy may alleviate (and possibly outweigh) the negative
welfare impact of a fat tax. Moreover, the thin subsidy may reinforce the health improvements of a fat
tax by increasing consumption of healthier foods. The overall welfare impact and the distributional
consequences of a combined ￿scal policy of a fat tax and thin subsidy is the focus of this paper. The
distributional consequences are assessed using the distributional characteristic derived by Feldstein
(1972) while the welfare impacts are measured using the method presented in Stern (1987) and Newbery
(1995).
This paper is organised as follows. A brief review of the literature is in section 2, with an emphasis on
the welfare e￿ects of ￿scal food policies. Section 3 describes the theoretical and empirical methodology.
The data are described in section 4, as well as the empirical results. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Fiscal food policies and social welfare
There is a growing literature investigating the e￿ects of fat taxes and more recently thin subsidies.
Much of the research emphasises health outcomes and focuses on the e￿ectiveness of ￿scal food inter-
ventions in reducing diet related chronic disease, such as obesity. However, no known study examines
the welfare e￿ects of fat taxes (and none in regards to thin subsidies) in a rigorous economic frame-
work. The few studies that in fact address distributional concerns do not do so within a true social
welfare context. When considering tax reform and the welfare e￿ect of changes in relative prices, like
the proposed changes in food prices from a combination of taxes and subsidies, analysis that follows
from a formal social welfare theory framework provides theoretical advantages and also provides limits
on the necessary assumptions about the data (Ahmad and Stern 1984).
3First, informal welfare measures of social welfare, such as money-metric measures like equivalent
and compensating variation, are far from ideal. Money metric utility measures assume by de￿nition
that the social marginal utility of income is equal to one in every household (Banks, Blundell, and
Lewbel 1996). As is discussed in the next section, this is a limiting assumption worth relaxing since
it does not allow distributional judgements. Moreover, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) show that
money metric measures violate concavity of social orderings over optimal commodity allocations unless
household preferences are homothetic. 2 Thus, while data requirements tend to be modest for money-
metric measures, they only represent valid measures of welfare under very strict assumptions which are
not normally descriptive of actual behaviour (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988). Second, considerations
of distributional equity can only be assessed under a rigorous social welfare model, which allows
the social marginal utility of income to di￿er between households and permits social judgements on
equality. By specifying a social welfare function with heterogeneous marginal utilities, not only can
welfare impacts due to price changes be assessed, but distributional implications can be analysed using
the distributional characteristic. The distributional characteristic gives a measure of the concentration
of consumption in low income households for a set of commodities and allows the analyst to see which
price changes resulting from a tax will have a greater impact on poor or rich households (Feldstein
1972). Hence, the distributional characteristic allows a policy-maker to appropriately target commodity
groups for taxes and subsidies and is a powerful tool in applied welfare economics. However, unlike
money-metric measures, the distributional characteristic requires a formal social welfare framework
with a well-de￿ned social welfare function and so accounts for social preferences.
Leicester and Windmeijer (2004) simulate a fat tax in the UK and assess the distributional e￿ects.
In their simulation, food was taxed based on four nutrients found to have adverse health consequences
when consumed in large quantities (saturated fat, mono-unsaturated fat, sodium, and cholesterol). The
tax was assessed at the rate of one pence per a kilogram of the nutrient. Based on the simulated tax rate
and using data from the 2000 National Food Survey, the fat tax is found to be highly regressive. The
poorest 2% of the 8000 household sample spend 0.7% of their income on the tax, while the richest pay
only 0.1% (the median income group pay about 0.25%). However, the welfare analysis in Leicester and
Windmeijer (2004) is very limiting. First, the calculations do not account for the potentially o￿setting
impact of subsidies. Second, the calculations do not allow for consumers to shift consumption in the
2Assuming homothetic preferences implies that an individual income consumption curve is linear over the whole
consumption set, which represents a critical ￿aw for applied welfare analysis. See Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) for
a theoretical proof.
4event of a price change. Third, the analysis is not based on a formal social welfare framework.
Chouinard et. al (2007) examine the welfare e￿ects of a fat tax on various dairy products using
a unique micro-data set on weekly average household purchases for a sample of 23 US cities. They
simulate the e￿ects of a fat tax based on the fat percentage of di￿erent dairy products. Based on a
10% tax rate, they calculate the equivalent variation as a measure of the welfare loss resulting from
the tax. Their results ￿nd the fat tax to be highly regressive, with the burden falling mostly on the
low-income households: the burden is 0.24% for households with an annual income of $20,000 USD, but
only 0.024% for households with an annual income of $100,000 USD. While the analysis in Chouinard
et. al (2007) uses demand elasticities and represents an improvement over the analysis in Leicester
and Windmeijer (2004), there remain key limitations. First, the framework in Chouinard et. al (2007)
is limited to dairy products and the elasticities computed in their paper do not account for the full
range of substitutability across di￿erent groups of goods. Furthermore, as already discussed, the use
of equivalent variation is open to a range of problems and is widely accepted to be a poor welfare
measure (Slesnick 1998).
Allais et. al (2010) conduct an analysis similar to Chouinard et. al (2007) except they estimate the
demand elasticities for a full range of food groups for a sample of French households using the TNS
Worldpanel survey. Simulating a 10% tax on foods in the cheese and butter category they ￿nd the
tax regressive as well: the burden is 0.22% for modest income households but only 0.068% for well-
o￿ households. However, their analysis su￿ers from similar ￿aws mentioned above since the welfare
calculations are based on equivalent variation and do not examine the impact of subsidies. Although
elementary in their welfare analysis, the papers by Leicester and Windmeijer (2004), Chouinard et. al
(2007), and Allais et. al (2010) represent the only attempt in the literature to investigate the welfare
e￿ects of fat taxes. To be fair, the focus of each of these papers is not on social welfare but rather on
the e￿ectiveness of fat taxes in changing diets and improving health, which is generally the focus of
all research regarding fat taxes and thin subsidies.
While the impact on health from ￿scal food policies is an important area of study, little to nothing is
known about the impact on social welfare resulting from a combination of fat taxes and thin subsidies.
This paper examines the impact of fat taxes and thin subsides within a formal and rigorous welfare
economics framework. The analysis provides two distinct economic measures of welfare. First, the dis-
tributional characteristic is computed providing information on the degree of concentration of di￿erent
food items in low income households and makes clear the extent to which taxes and subsidies will
5impact the poor. Second, ￿rst-order and second-order welfare measure approximations are calculated
to assess the overall impact of fat taxes and thin subsidies on social welfare. The next section derives
each of these measures and provides an intuitive interpretation of both the distributional characteristic
and welfare approximations in the context of ￿scal food policies.
3 The welfare impact of price changes
The method employed in this paper is based on the theory of marginal tax reform and normative
optimal taxation theory. The theory originates with Feldstein (1972) and Ahmad and Stern (1984)
and is based on the optimal commodity taxation rules derived by Ramsey (1927) and Samuelson
(1986). Good summaries are found in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Newbery and Stern (1987), and
Santoro (2007). In this method, a set of indirect tax policies are judged based on their distributional
impact within a utilitarian social welfare framework. Two aspects of a change in price are being
assessed. First, the redistributive e￿ect of the price change is gauged through the calculation of the
distributional characteristic for a set of disaggregate goods. Second, the overall impact of the price
change on social welfare is assessed using an approximate measure of welfare.
The starting point is the social welfare function, which aggregates individual welfare levels. De￿ne

















, which is a function of household expenditures, eh and a vector of prices, p.4 Note that the
household consumes a number of goods, where i = 1;:::;G and each household is assumed to face
the same set of prices. The social welfare function in equation 1 is of the Bergson-Samuelson class,
in which society’s welfare is a function only of the individual utilities of its members (Bergson 1938,
Samuelson 1956).
Consider a marginal change in the consumer price of good i from pi to p?
i, where p?
i = pi + pi
and pi is the marginal price change. The impact on social welfare, W, from a marginal change in
3Given that household expenditure data is used in the welfare analysis, the relevant unit of measure in this paper is
the household rather than the individual agent. See Slesnick (1998, p. 2123 - 2125) for a discussion on the justi￿cations
and limitations of modelling the household as the decision-making unit.
4Indirect utility is a function of expenditure rather than income in the welfare analysis. Slesnick (1998, p. 2146)
states that ￿in a static context the appropriate welfare indicator should be a function of total expenditure rather than




















where W? is social welfare at the changed price and W is social welfare at the original price. The ￿rst
step in examining the welfare impact of a price change, such as one resulting from a fat tax or thin
subsidy, is to approximate the e￿ect in equation 2. To gauge the distributional consequences of a price
change on food expenditure, the distributional characteristic is computed. Attention now turns to the
derivation of the distributional characteristic, followed by the derivation of the approximate welfare
measure.
3.1 The distributional characteristic
Feldstein (1972) introduces the concept of the distributional characteristic of a good as a way
of explicitly considering the distributional equity of optimal prices and taxes. By considering not
just e￿ciency but also equity, the distributional characteristic represents a value judgement. The
distributional characteristic is commonly used to examine distributional consequences from indirect
taxes and price changes (See, for example, Newbery (1995), Ray (1999), and Liberati (2001)). 5 In
the context of a ￿scal food policy, changes in food prices can have implications for the distribution of
income, especially since the poor tend to spend a disproportionately large share of income on food-
related items. The distributional characteristic measures the extent consumption of a good (such as
chips or fresh fruit) is distributed across the distribution of income (or expenditure). The key advantage
of computing the distributional characteristic is that it provides information on the distributional
impacts of indirect price changes, like those caused by fat taxes and thin subsidies, by showing what
price changes in goods will impact the less well-o￿ the most. With the distributional characteristic,
the policy-maker is equipped with a tool to aid in targeting decisions of indirect taxes and subsidies.
The approach is based on that pioneered by Bergson (1937) and Samuelson (1947). Before deriving
the distributional characteristic, ￿rst consider the impact on social welfare from a change in household
expenditure
5Previous studies tend to use the distributional characteristic in an ex post fashion in which the welfare impact of
price changes that have already occurred is being analysed. The use of the distributional characteristic in this paper is
ex ante, that is, the welfare impact of price changes that may occur is being analysed. This is similar in spirit to the
problem investigated in Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) who suppose a hypothetical price change on clothing to

















@V h  h; (3)
where h is the private marginal utility of expenditure (or income). The value of h is the social weight
or the social marginal utility of household h receiving an additional unit of expenditure (Newbery
1995) and it therefore combines the weighting of the policy maker or social planner @W
@V h with that of
the private individual, h.6 More simply, h represents society’s valuation of one additional unit of
expenditure given to household h. The distributional value judgements of the policy maker determine
the form of the social welfare function in equation (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). In practise
the form chosen is typically the additive utilitarian form where W =
P
h V h, which implies that the
social weights h for each household equal the private marginal utility of income, h. The form chosen
for the indirect utility function is usually the isoelastic form whose marginal utilities have constant
elasticity. This is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.
The distributional characteristic is used to measure the extent to which consumption of a particular
good is concentrated in those households which are deemed to be socially deserving where ￿socially
deserving￿ is recognised by those households with higher values of h. This is achieved by constructing






social utility and aggregating across households. Thus, following Newbery (1995), the distributional
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  1
H
PH




is aggregate consumption of the ith good.7 The measure is unit free, given the normalisation of the
individual household social weight (h) by the overall average social weight ( ), and is bounded between
zero and one. In terms of price changes, the distributional characteristic is interpreted as a measure
of the relative harm/bene￿t of placing a tax/subsidy on the ith good relative to the harm/bene￿t of
placing a tax/subsidy on all households directly (Kaplanoglou 2004).
We compute the distributional characteristic for di￿erent food groups (milk, cheese, pork, fresh
fruits and vegetables, tinned fruit and vegetables, etc). This will reveal if consumption of certain
food groups are distributed to the socially deserving or not. The higher the value of di, the more
6Feldstein (1972) de￿nes the marginal social utility of income as the derivative of the social welfare function with
respect to household income.
7The numerator of the distributional characteristic is actually the absolute impact of a price change on social welfare,
which is derived in the next section.
8concentrated the consumption of the food group on the more socially deserving households. A typical
welfare framework would imply that food groups with a low di should be taxed while food groups
with a high di should be subsidised. In a social welfare context, any tax on the food group with
a relatively high distributional characteristic will be highly regressive if evaluated against income or
total expenditure. However, from a public health perspective the implications are di￿erent. Given the
extant literature, high distributional characteristics are likely to be found for energy-dense, nutrient-
poor, fatty foods (e.g., pre-packaged ready made meals), which tend to be less expensive than healthier,
low calorie, nutrient-rich foods (e.g., fresh fruits and vegetables) per calorie (Dowler 2003; Drenowski
2004; Frazao et. al 2007). Consumption of fatty and sugary foods contributes to a range of public
health problems, such as diabetes and heart disease, and so the use of ￿scal instruments has been
debated as a means of shifting consumption towards healthier choices.
In this paper, the distributional characteristics reveal the extent to which consumption of unhealthy
foods (e.g., fats and cheeses) is concentrated in the ￿socially deserving￿ (i.e., low-income households)
and the extent to which consumption of healthy foods (e.g., fresh fruits and vegetables) is concentrated
in the ￿socially undeserving￿ (i.e., high-income households). If this is the case, then from a public health
perspective unhealthy foods should be taxed while healthy foods should be subsidised to improve the
distribution of health among low-income households. However, from a social welfare perspective the
opposite could be true: unhealthy foods should be subsidised while healthy foods should be taxed.
If the distributional characteristics reveal that consumption of unhealthy foods are not concentrated
in low-income households, then a fat tax appears more attractive both from an economic welfare
perspective and a public health perspective. While obviously still regressive on low-income households,
the negative welfare e￿ect of the fat tax may be compensated for by a thin subsidy on healthier food
options. The direction of the welfare e￿ect, in terms of income changes, is approximated by the welfare
measures derived in the next section.
3.2 Welfare approximation
While computation of the distributional characteristics discussed in the previous section is impor-
tant for summarising the distributional impact of fat taxes and thin subsidies, it does not address the
aggregate change change in social welfare. Measures that approximate the e￿ect in equation 2, that is
the impact on welfare from a change in price, are used to gauge aggregate welfare e￿ects. First-order
welfare approximations are discussed, which have the notable advantage of not requiring information
9on consumer demand behaviour. While second-order welfare approximations extend the ￿rst-order
approximation to account for possible shifts in consumption resulting from price changes, the calcula-
tion requires estimation of demand elasticities. As such, the current paper con￿nes attention to the
￿rst-order approximations (with the second-order approximations to be considered in future work).
As a starting point, suppose the the price of good i increases through a marginal change in the tax
rate. In money terms, household h is worse by the quantity consumed, qh
i , or in utility terms is worse
o￿ by h  qh
i (Ahmad and Stern 1984). Using Roy’s identity the change in household utility from a





The change in social utility for a small change in price (e.g., a tax or subsidy on quantities) in equation
2 can be approximated to provide a numerical measure of the change in social welfare. The ￿rst-order


































From the ￿rst-order approximation in equation 7, the welfare impact of a price change is seen to
depend on two factors: the distribution of consumption, given by the social weights h, and the level
of consumption among households, given by qh
i (Newbery 1995). The ￿rst-order welfare measure in
equation 8 expresses the idea that if the marginal price paid for good i changes through either a tax or
a subsidy, then the welfare loss or gain to the household depends upon the current expenditure by the
household on the ith good. In the context of fat taxes and thin subsidies, suppose a government policy
proposes a tax (subsidy) on food group i totalling ¿1. An alternative to the ￿scal policy proposal would
be to apply the tax (subsidy) directly on all households so that each household is taxed (subsidised)
in the amount of 1
H¿1. The tax (subsidy) on the good is preferred over the direct tax (subsidy) only
when household expenditure on good i is below (above) the average household (Alan et. al 2002).
The approximate welfare change resulting from a marginal change in price of the ith good is found
10by summing the social marginal utilities of income, h, weighted by consumption of good i over all
households.8 Alternatively, the ￿rst-order approximation can be written in terms of the distributional
characteristic
W =  diQipi; (8)
since the numerator of the distributional characteristic de￿ned in equation 4 is equal to the welfare
approximation in equation 7 (Newbery 1995). The relevance of the distributional characteristic to
the welfare e￿ects of price changes is made more clear in the approximation given by equation 8.
When a price increase occurs for a good whose consumption is concentrated in households with high
marginal utilities of expenditure (i.e., low-income or socially deserving households), the price increase
will have a more negative impact than if the price increase occurred on a good whose consumption is
concentrated in households with low marginal utilities of expenditure (i.e., high-income households).
Given that price changes may occur over the spectrum of goods consumed, the e￿ect on social welfare





An expression for the proportional change in social welfare resulting from changes in prices is obtained








Equation 10 measures the proportional impact of price changes on aggregate social welfare and has
the useful interpretation of the percent change in welfare caused by a change in price.
3.3 Implementation
To make the welfare approach operational, knowledge of two components is required: household
expenditure on a set of goods and the ability to determine socially deserving households. Expenditure
8 Implicitly producer prices are assumed ￿xed so the change in price on good i is equivalent to the tax on that good.
While the assumption simpli￿es distributional issues and serves as an appropriate benchmark, tax over-shifting is a
possibility (Liberati 2001).
11data is easily obtained from household budget surveys. The social weights, h, provide the ability of
identifying households more deserving of marginal increases in income. To calculate the social weights,
the social welfare function must ￿rst be given a functional form.
An additive social welfare function of isoelastic utility functions, originally proposed by Atkinson
(1970), is the most frequently used social welfare function in the marginal indirect taxation literature
(see, for example, Ahmad and Stern (1984), Madden (1995a), Madden (1995b), Newbery (1995), and





Indirect utility is de￿ned over real expenditure (consumption) per equivalent adult, Eh, and is para-
metrised as




V h = lnEh  = 1
; (12)
where   0 is the coe￿cient of inequality aversion. The social welfare function is more egalitarian
with greater values of . Thus, under additive social preferences, social welfare is approximated by the
weighted sum of expenditures per equivalent adult. 9 The indirect utility function, V h, is in the family
of isoelastic utility functions where the marginal utilities have constant elasticity.









The social value of a marginal unit of income to the poorest household is worth 2 times as much
to a household with twice the income. Thus, values of  that are successively greater than zero
lead to greater weight being applied to poorer households. By increasing the value of the coe￿cient
of inequality aversion, , the relative weight given to consumption of low-income households in the
distributional characteristic (i.e., h) is also increased. In other words, di￿erent values of  lead to
di￿erent judgements regarding income transfers. For example, suppose Household A has half the
income of Household B. If  = 1, a marginal unit of income has twice as much social value when
transferred to Household A rather than Household B. If  = 2, a marginal unit of income has quadruple
9Total expenditure on all goods in each household is divided by the number of equivalent adults in each household
to obtain expenditure per equivalent adult. The actual number of equivalent adults are obtained using the OECD
equivalence scales, which counts the ￿rst adult in the household as one ￿full￿ person. Additional adults count as 0.7 and
children under the age of 14 count as 0.5.
12the social value when transferred to Household A. The precise de￿nition of the social welfare weights
in equation 13 depends upon the speci￿cation of the social welfare function and the indirect utility
function.
The additive social welfare function in equation 11 based on the isoelastic indirect utility func-





;where F () is an increasing, concave function) in which the welfare weights only depend
on the expenditure level and are independent of prices. 10 In this framework, the social planner makes
an intentional decision or social judgement to weight household utility. The isoelastic form is conve-
nient since the coe￿cient of inequality aversion has an intuitive meaning: a one percent decrease in
income (or expenditure) implies a  percent increase in marginal social utility (Feldstein 1972). The
isoelastic utility function is also convenient in the context of indirect tax reform because assumptions
about inequality can be adjusted by means of a single parameter (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
1995).11 On one extreme end when  = 0 then W =
P
V h is the Benthamian pure utilitarian case
of no inequality aversion and h collapses to unity meaning all households are applied the same social
weight so distributional issues are of no concern. In the pure utilitarian case, increases and decreases
in individual household utility imply a one-for-one change in social utility, and is often referred to
as the linear-in-utility welfare function since the indi￿erence curves are linear (Varian 1992). On the
other extreme end when  ! 1 then W = min

V 1;:::;V H	
is the Rawlsian maximin case in which
only the utility of the poorest household matters (i.e., the utility of the household with the lowest
consumption or expenditure). In the maximin case all the social weight is applied to worst-o￿ hou-
sehold and the indi￿erence curves are lexicographic or L-shaped (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
1995). A range of values for  are used in the empirical analysis to see if conclusions are robust to
di￿erent distributional judgements.
4 Data and empirical results
4.1 Food data and ￿scal policy
Data on food expenditures and quantities are from the UK government’s Expenditure and Food
Survey (EFS) for 2003-2004, which records data on a wide range of food eaten. The EFS (starting in
10Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) discuss the drawbacks associate with assuming price-independent social weights.
11While most welfare studies on indirect taxes and price changes utilise the isoelastic form, other function forms can
be used. Cragg (1991), for example, uses the Kolm-Pollak utility function.
132001-2002) is the result of the merger between the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and the National
Food Survey (NFS), two well established surveys and important sources of information for government
and the broad research community on UK spending and food consumption patterns. In this study we
use the 2003-2004 data-set, which is the latest (at the time of starting to work with the data) complete
dataset available from the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS). The 2003-2004 sample is based
on 7,014 households in 672 postcode sectors strati￿ed by Government O￿ce Region in England and
Wales. Participating households voluntarily record food purchases for consumption at home for a two
week period using a food diary for each individual over seven years of age. The data collected by the
food diaries are supplemented with the use of till receipts.
The EFS identi￿es four major categories of interest: food (sub-divided in 55 categories), non-
alcoholic drink (sub-divided in 7 groups), alcoholic drink (sub-divided in 4 groups) and catering services
(split into 3 categories). In addition to data on food expenditure and quantity, other key variables
are available, including: ownership of food-related durables (fridges, freezers etc.), housing tenure, key
demographics (age, sex, employment status etc.) for each household member, type and composition,
social class of head of household, region and categorical degree of activity for head of household (i.e.
sedentary, active etc.). While information is collected on eating out expenditure, food eaten out of the
home is omitted from the analysis since no data on quantities is provided. The data extracted from
the EFS are prepared into a form suitable for welfare calculation.
Individual food items and farm commodities are converted into aggregate food groups that can be
identi￿ed for a fat tax or thin subsidy. Five main food group aggregations are used in the analysis:
dairy, eggs, and fats; meat and ￿sh, cereals and potatoes; fruits and vegetables; and drinks. A sixth
category of ￿other foods￿ is used to categorise those component food items that do not clearly ￿t
into the other ￿ve categories. 12 Each of the main food groups are composed of component food item
groups (25 in total), which are detailed in the ￿rst two columns of Table 1. While such broad aggregates
simpli￿es the analysis, detailed information is inevitably lost in the aggregation process. For example,
the ￿milk￿ category includes both full-fat and skimmed milk, and the distributional characteristics
may potentially di￿er between these two sub-category items. Table 1 also presents the expenditure
shares as well as the mean and standard deviation of the quantity consumed and the expenditure of
the component food group items. In regards to units, mean quantities consumed per household are
in grams or millilitre equivalent and expenditure per household is in pence. The food items with the
12The exact food group items that compose each of the component food groups is available in an appendix upon
request to the author
14three highest budget shares are alcohol, fresh fruits and vegetables, and other meats. The foot items
with the three lowest budget shares are frozen fruits and vegetables, eggs, and fruit and vegetable
ready-based meals.
The fat tax applied to selected food groups is based on saturated fatty acids, while the subsidy is
applied to fruit & vegetables. The ￿scal policy used, based on a combination of taxes and subsidies, is
designed to be a revenue-neutral scheme. The choice of saturated fatty acids as the prime target of the
fat tax is justi￿ed by evidence from the medical literature. Saturated fats are an important risk factor
in the occurrence of coronary heart disease (Hu et al. 1997), higher systolic blood pressure (Esrey et
al. 1996), and higher plasma concentration of cholesterol (Ascherio et al. 1994). Fruit and vegetables,
on the other hand, are positively linked to lower risks of various cancers (Ames et al. 1995; Riboli
and Norat 2003), major chronic diseases (Hung et al. 2001), and ischaemic stroke (Joshipura et al.
2001). Speci￿cally, the ￿scal scheme simulation increases the price of each food group by 1% for every
percent of saturated fats the group contains. The EFS dataset contains nutrient conversion tables that
are used to convert food group items into nutrient content. For example, since milk contains 1.72% of
saturated fats, its price increasing by 1.72%. A ceiling of 15% is placed on the simulated price increase.
To o￿set this tax burden, and to encourage the consumption of fruit and vegetables, a subsidy on fruit
and vegetables is introduced, so as to exactly cancel the costs of the fat tax paid by consumers. Table
1 presents the tax and subsidy rates applied to the di￿erent component food group items and assigns
an index number to each group.
4.2 Results
Recall from section 3.1 that the distributional characteristic of a good is a measure of the relation-
ship between a household’s consumption of a good and the marginal value of a change in household
income. The distributional characteristic is a scale free measure, between zero and one, with values
closer to one indicating that consumption of a particular good is concentrated in poor households.
Tax receipts will be disproportionately paid by lower-income households the larger the distributional
characteristic of a good. A subsidy on a good with a smaller distributional characteristic will be dis-
proportionately paid to higher income households. Subsequently, from an economic welfare viewpoint,
goods with larger distributional characteristic ought to be subsidised while goods with a smaller dis-
tributional characteristics ought to be taxed. Table 4 presents the distributional characteristics of the
component food items in descending order as well as the rank order of the commodities. The distri-
15butional characteristics are calculated based on di￿erent values of the inequality aversion coe￿cient
re￿ecting low ( = 0:5), moderate ( = 1:0; 1:5), and high ( = 2:0) inequality aversion.
Generally, the four food groups with the highest ranking (i.e., the highest distributional characte-
ristics), re￿ecting expenditure being concentrated amongst households with high marginal utilities of
expenditure (i.e., low-income households) are milk, bread, eggs, and potatoes. Although when  = 2:0,
the fats food group replaces potatoes in ranking as the fourth highest and potatoes drop in ranking to
eighth. The four food groups with the lowest ranking, re￿ecting expenditure being concentrated in the
higher income households are alcohol, lamb, fruit and vegetable ready-based meals, and ￿sh, which is
consistent throughout the di￿erent degrees of inequality aversion. In between the two extremes the
rankings of food items does not remain constant but shifts.
Table 4 also shows that in many instances the distributional characteristics are very close in value
for some goods. For example, when  = 1:0, tea and co￿ee, fats, rice and pasta, cereal, other foods,
and other cereals have distributional characteristics that are very close. Overall, results show minor
variation in the value of the distributional characteristics over the food groups considered for the
di￿erent values of inequality aversion. For example, when  = 1:0, the distributional characteristics
are all greater than 0:5, meaning food consumption is relatively concentrated in the socially deserving
households.
Suppose the distributional characteristics under each value of inequality aversion are split into a
top half and bottom half, say at the 13th ranking, for example. Then what becomes clear is that
generally the fruit and vegetable food groups targeted for subsidy are often found in the bottom
half (i.e., amongst those food items whose consumption is concentrated in the less socially deserving
households). Moreover, the food items that have the heaviest tax applied to them (fats, for example)
amongst the food items that are more heavily concentrated in the socially deserving households.
According to the distributional characteristics in Table 4, a welfare enhancing policy prescription
would be to tax the food items with the lowest distributional characteristics while subsidising the
foods with the highest distributional characteristics. However, according to the ￿scal policy scheme
implemented, with the intention of inducing healthier diets, the foods with the highest distributional
characteristics are all targeted for fat taxes. While policy guided by public health concerns may desire
higher prices in food groups such as fats and lower prices in fresh fruits and vegetables, an policy
guided by economic welfare considerations would suggest a subsidy on fats and a tax fresh fruits and
vegetables.
16While the distributional characteristics suggest that a fat tax policy will disproportionately burden
low-income households, the welfare approximation in equation 10 is calculated to provide a measure
of the overall impact on welfare as a result of the ￿scal policy. Given that there is a possibility that
the thin subsidy may o￿set the negative welfare impacts of the fat tax, the welfare measure yields
the percent change in welfare caused by the simulated price change. Table 5 reports the results of
computing expression 10 for the ￿scal policy described in Table 3 for di￿erent values of inequality
aversion. While the percent changes in welfare are small, the overall impact on social welfare from the
￿scal policy is negative. Moreover, the negative changes in welfare are increasing in the level of aversion
to inequality, which implies that the ￿scal policy has redistributive e￿ect that is particularly adverse to
low-income households. The relatively small impact is not surprising, given that food represents just
one of many di￿erent consumption bundles and the overall basket of goods consumed by households.
The important outcome is the negative impact on welfare, despite the revenue-neutral stance of the
￿scal policy and its intention to improve public health. On economic welfare grounds, the fat tax and
thin subsidy policy used in this paper would harm social welfare overall. This ￿nding is important
since it suggest that even a revenue-neutral ￿scal food policy can negative redistributive impacts and
casts doubt on the ability of a combined fat tax and thin subsidy to improve health without negatively
a￿ecting the poor and the population at large.
5 Conclusions
Obesity is of increasing concern throughout the developed world. Some estimates suggest that by
2015, 60% of men and 50% of women will be obese. Being obese increases the risks of a range of chronic
health problems including heart disease, type 2 diabetes and high blood pressure. Additionally it has
been shown that increased levels of fruit and vegetable consumption will contribute to a reduction in
the incidence of some cancers. As a result, there is an increase in interest in public health policies
that are designed to reduce the impacts of diet related disease. One such policy is a ￿scal intervention
designed to reduce the consumption of calorie and fat dense food and to encourage the consumption
of fruit and vegetables.
There is a trade-o￿ between health and wealth from imposing a fat tax on society. In terms of
public health, taxing unhealthy, fatty foods is likely to have a positive health e￿ect as consumers shift
their distribution of consumption to healthier food choices. However, in terms of social welfare, since
17consumption of fatty and calorie dense foods tends to be concentrated in low income households, a fat
tax is likely to extremely regressive. This paper ￿lls a knowledge gap by focusing on the redistribution
of income resulting from a tax-subsidy combination on di￿erent food groups. Further, unlike previous
studies, this paper uses a formal welfare economics framework to assess the welfare implications of a
combination of fat taxes and thin subsidies.
This paper examines the distributional consequences and economic welfare impacts of such a policy.
The study ￿nds that there is a trade-o￿ between public health and economic welfare from imposing a fat
tax on society. Energy-dense/nutrient-poor foods are disproportionately consumed among low-income
households, which are the foods most likely to be taxed by a ￿fat tax￿ policy. Fiscal interventions
will have adverse welfare implications for the very population it is intended to bene￿t. The research
shows that while a fat-tax/thin-subsidy may have a progressive redistribution of health, it will have
a regressive redistribution of wealth. Results suggest that a blanket ￿scal policy is too blunt an
instrument to achieve the intended results. Too many people are consuming diets that are considerable
distance from recommended health guidelines. The overall conclusion is that the taxed food groups
will hurt the poor in terms of economic welfare and will be highly regressive. Moreover, the subsidies
applied to fruits and vegetables is not large enough in magnitude to o￿set the negative welfare impacts
of the fat taxes imposed. Therefore, a blanket ￿scal policy is too blunt an instrument and what is
needed are speci￿cally targeted policies focusing on people consuming extremely bad diets.
Future work will incorporate several modi￿cations. First, while the ￿rst-order welfare approxima-
tion used here has the advantage of limited data requirements (since only knowledge of expenditure
is required), it may also be a biased estimate. The ￿rst-order approximation does not account for
changes in consumption in response to price changes, so it may overestimate the welfare impact of
a price increase from a tax or underestimate the welfare impact of a price decrease from a subsidy
(Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel 1996). A second-order approximation will be computed in future work
to assess the extent of this bias. Moreover, di￿erent ￿scal food policies can be constructed, which
may have di￿erential welfare impacts. While the tax in this paper is based on grams of saturated
fat content, other options include taxes on selected food categories or on the calorie content of foods.
Subsidies are likely to be limited to fruit and vegetables, though this could be generalised to be based
on dietary ￿bre content. Lastly, while this paper uses the 2003-2004 EFS dataset, future work will
include additional years.
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23Table 3: Fiscal food policy
Index Number Component Foods Tax / Subsidy
1 Milk 1.46%
2 Cheese & cream 15.00%








11 Other meats 5.40%
12 Potatoes 1.16%
13 Breads 0.58%
14 Breakfast cereals 0.88%
15 Rice & pasta 1.16%
16 Other cereals 4.75%
17 Fresh fruit & vegetables -14.78%
18 Frozen fruit & vegetables -14.78%
19 Tinned fruit & vegetables -14.78%
20 Prepared fruit & vegetables -14.78%
21 Fruit & vegetable based meals 2.27%
22 Tea & co￿ee 0.55%
23 Soft drinks 0.00%
24 Alcohol 0.01%
25 Other (excluded from policy) 0.00%
24Table 4: Distributional characteristics of food groups
Social weight based on:
 = 0:5  = 1:0  = 1:5  = 2:0
rank di index di index di index di index
1 0.941 1 0.828 1 0.582 1 0.272 1
2 0.924 13 0.793 13 0.528 13 0.191 13
3 0.915 4 0.780 4 0.518 4 0.189 4
4 0.914 12 0.768 12 0.485 12 0.156 5
5 0.905 22 0.755 22 0.478 22 0.156 25
6 0.903 14 0.753 5 0.478 5 0.155 22
7 0.903 5 0.749 15 0.474 15 0.154 15
8 0.901 15 0.749 14 0.470 25 0.154 12
9 0.900 16 0.745 25 0.466 14 0.145 14
10 0.899 25 0.742 16 0.457 23 0.144 23
11 0.896 18 0.737 23 0.456 16 0.142 19
12 0.896 23 0.735 18 0.451 18 0.138 16
13 0.895 11 0.734 11 0.450 11 0.137 11
14 0.888 19 0.726 19 0.449 19 0.136 18
15 0.886 3 0.718 3 0.436 6 0.136 6
16 0.878 6 0.711 6 0.434 3 0.135 17
17 0.878 17 0.709 17 0.434 17 0.131 20
18 0.875 8 0.704 20 0.428 20 0.130 3
19 0.874 20 0.703 2 0.425 2 0.128 2
20 0.874 2 0.700 8 0.423 9 0.127 9
21 0.871 9 0.699 9 0.418 8 0.124 8
22 0.870 10 0.695 10 0.415 10 0.122 10
23 0.866 21 0.687 21 0.408 21 0.120 21
24 0.840 7 0.648 7 0.375 7 0.107 7
25 0.807 24 0.598 24 0.332 24 0.091 24
Table 5: Welfare e￿ect of ￿scal policy
Proportional change in welfare
 = 0:5  = 1:0  = 1:5  = 2:0
-0.0031 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0035
25